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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
No. 11-2587 
_____________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
CARLOS RODRIGUEZ-NORIEGA, 
                                                           Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00085-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2012 
____________ 
Before: VANASKIE, ALDISERT and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 11, 2012) 
____________ 
OPINION 
____________ 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Defendant Carlos Rodriguez-Noriega (―Rodriguez‖) pleaded guilty pursuant to a 
plea agreement, waiving his right to appeal a sentence within or below an agreed-upon 
guideline range.  The District Court sentenced Rodriguez within this range.  
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Notwithstanding his waiver, Rodriguez appealed.  His counsel, J. Michael Farrell, has 
moved to withdraw and has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), and Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a), asserting that there are no nonfrivolous issues 
on appeal.  We will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant the motion to withdraw.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 An undercover investigation by the Drug Enforcement Agency resulted in 
Rodriguez‘s arrest and plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  As part of the plea agreement, 
Rodriguez waived his right to appeal a sentence within or below the guideline range 
resulting from a total offense level of 25.  He reserved the right to challenge the District 
Court‘s determination of his criminal history category. 
 On February 9, 2011, the District Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy with 
the assistance of an interpreter.  It determined, among other things, that Rodriguez was 
not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or a debilitating mental condition, and that he 
had reviewed the charges and plea agreement with counsel, aided by an interpreter.  The 
Court advised Rodriguez that the stipulations in the plea agreement, as well as the 
sentencing guidelines, were not binding on the Court, and that he could be sentenced 
anywhere from the mandatory minimum of 5 years to the maximum sentence of 40 years.  
Finally, the Court informed Rodriguez that, by pleading guilty, he would lose important 
rights, and explained the waiver of his right to appeal.  Rodriguez stated that he 
understood all of this and provided a factual basis for his plea.  The Court accepted the 
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plea after finding that it was knowing and voluntary.  
 Sentencing took place on June 2, 2011.  Defense counsel argued that Rodriguez 
was entitled to a downward adjustment of 2 levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for his 
minor role in the offense, and to a downward variance for the same reason.  Neither the 
plea agreement nor the PSR had mentioned § 3B1.2(b).  In an abundance of caution, 
however, the District Court considered Rodriguez‘s argument for an adjustment under § 
3B1.2(b) and a variance, denying both because Rodriguez was not merely a minor 
courier.  Rather, the Court concluded, Rodriguez had an ongoing employment 
relationship with the main trafficker, he was aware of the scope of the conspiracy, he 
transported a substantial amount of drugs, and his presence at meetings made it appear 
that he was protecting the main trafficker.  The Court ultimately agreed with the PSR‘s 
application of the safety valve provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and with its calculation of 
the guideline range as 57 to 71 months, based on an offense level of 25 and criminal 
history category of I.  After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the Court stated 
that the case ―cries out for a guideline sentence . . . [and] that anything other than a 
guideline sentence really does defeat all of the purposes of [§] 3553.‖ (App. 127a).  It 
then sentenced Rodriguez to 57 months‘ imprisonment and 5 years‘ supervised release—
the bottom of the applicable range.  This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Under Anders, if appellate counsel ―finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a 
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw.  That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything 
in the record that might arguably support the appeal.‖ 386 U.S. at 744; see also Third 
Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a).  ―The Court‘s inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is 
thus twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule‘s requirements; and (2) 
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.‖ United 
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 With respect to the first requirement, counsel must ―satisfy the court that [he] has 
thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and . . . explain why the 
issues are frivolous.‖  Id.  He need not address every possible claim but must at least 
make a ―conscientious examination.‖  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  Regarding the 
second requirement, the Court should generally confine its independent review to those 
portions of the record identified by an adequate Anders brief.
2
  See id. at 301.  An appeal 
―is frivolous where none of the legal points are arguable on their merits.‖  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).   
 Counsel has satisfied his obligation by conscientiously reviewing the record for 
any appealable errors, finding none.  He summarized the plea and sentencing hearings in 
detail, and concluded that the appellate waiver precludes any appeal.  Even if it did not, 
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 Rodriguez did not file a pro se brief. 
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he continued, the sole possible issue—the District Court‘s rejection of Rodriguez‘s 
argument for a downward adjustment or variance based on his allegedly minor role in the 
conspiracy—lacks merit.  
 Our independent review confirms this conclusion.  The District Court conducted a 
thorough plea allocution that complied with the requirements of Rule 11(b).  See United 
States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2006).  The record supports its 
finding that Rodriguez‘s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a 
sufficient factual basis.  The Court explained to Rodriguez that, by pleading guilty, he 
would waive his right to appeal a sentence within the guideline range based on an offense 
level of 25.  He replied that he understood.  Rodriguez was sentenced within this 
guideline range.  Moreover, because the Court applied a criminal history category of I, 
Rodriguez has no basis to challenge its determination of his criminal history category—
the only other issue his waiver preserved for appeal.  Finally, there are no ―‗unusual 
circumstances‘‖ here that require invalidating the waiver to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice.  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Because we find no arguable merit to the appeal, we will grant counsel‘s motion to 
withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.  Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(b), the 
issues presented in this appeal lack legal merit for purposes of counsel filing a petition for 
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.   
